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These notes examine the problem of how to extend envelope theorems to in￿nite-horizon
dynamic mechanism design settings, with an application to the design of "bandit auctions."1 The environment
To facilitate the exposition, we follow the same notation as in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2009)
(hereafter PST. While the environment considered here features a single agent, the results easily
extend to settings with multiple agents under the additional assumptions of independence of types
across agents and quasilinearity in payo⁄s discussed in Section 4 in PST (see also the application
to the design of pro￿t-maximizing-auctions for experience goods in the next section).
Set-up. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1;2;:::;T with T 2 N [ f+1g. In each period t
there is a contractible decision yt 2 Yt, whose outcome is observed by the agent. (In the application
considered in the next section we apply the model to a more general setup with multiple agents
where yt is the part of the decision taken in period t that is observed by the agent.) Each Yt is
assumed to be a measurable space with the sigma-algebra left implicit. The set of all possible
histories of feasible decisions is denoted by Y ￿
QT
￿=1 Y￿, with y denoting a generic element of Y:1
Likewise, the set of all feasible period-t histories of decisions is denoted by Y t ￿
QT
￿=1 Y￿.
Before the period-t decision is taken, the agent receives some private information ￿t 2 ￿t ￿ R.
We implicitly endow the set ￿t with the Borel sigma-algebra. We refer to ￿t as the agent￿ s current
type. The set of all possible type histories at period t is then denoted by ￿t ￿
Qt
￿=1 ￿￿. An element
￿ of ￿ ￿
QT




where ￿ 2 R++ in case T < 1 while ￿ 2 (0;1) for T = 1:
The distribution of the current type ￿t may depend on the entire history of types and decisions
(￿t￿1;yt￿1) 2 ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1. In particular, we assume that the distribution of ￿t is governed by a
history-dependent probability measure (￿kernel￿ ) Ft
￿
￿j￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
on ￿t such that Ft (Aj￿) : ￿t￿1￿
Y t￿1 ! R is measurable for all measurable sets A ￿ ￿t.2 We denote the collection of kernels by
F ￿
￿
Ft : ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1 ! ￿(￿t)
￿T
t=1 ;
where for any measurable set A, ￿(A) denotes the set of probability measures on A. We abuse
notation by using Ft(￿j￿t￿1;yt￿1) to also denote the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) cor-
responding to the measure Ft(￿t￿1;yt￿1). Throughout, we assume that for all t, ￿t = (￿t;￿t) ￿ R
for some ￿1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t ￿ +1.
Finally, let B(￿) ￿ f￿ 2 ￿ : k￿k￿ < +1g the set of types whose norm is ￿nite. We will assume
1By convention, all products of measurable spaces encountered in the text are endowed with the product sigma-
algebra.
2Throughout, we adopt the convention that for any set A, A
0 ￿ f?g.
1that, given the stochastic process that corresponds to the kernels F; for any mechanism and any
strategy of the agent in the mechanism, ￿ 2 B(￿) with probability one. With an abuse of notation,
we then simply let B(￿) = ￿:
The agent is a von Neumann-Morgenstern decision maker whose preferences over lotteries over
￿ ￿ Y are represented by the expectation of a (measurable) Bernoulli utility function
U : ￿ ￿ Y ! R:
Although some form of time separability of U is typically assumed in applications, this is not needed
for our results. What is essential is only that the agent￿ s preferences be time consistent, which is
captured by the assumption that the agent is an expected-utility maximizer, with a Bermoulli
utility function that is constant over time.
An often encountered special case in applications is one where private information evolves in a
Markovian fashion, and where the agent￿ s payo⁄ is Markovian in the following sense.
De￿nition 1 The environment is Markov if
M1 for all t, and all (￿t￿1;yt￿1) 2 ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1, Ft(￿j￿t￿1;yt￿1) does not depend on ￿t￿2, and
M2 there exists functions
￿




Bt : ￿t ￿ Y t ! R
￿T
t=1 such that for all













Condition (1) guarantees that the stochastic process governing the evolution of the agent￿ s type




the agent￿ s von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries over future types and decisions
depend on the type history ￿t only through the current type ￿t. In particular, it encompasses the
case of additive-separable preferences (At
￿
￿t;yt￿




= 0 for all t < T).
Mechanisms. A mechanism in the above environment assigns a set of possible messages to
the agent in each period. The agent sends a message from this set and the mechanism responds
with a (possibly randomized) decision that may depend on the entire history of messages sent up
to period t, and on past decisions. By the Revelation Principle (Myerson, 86), for any standard
solution concept, any distribution on ￿￿Y that can be induced as an equilibrium outcome in any
￿indirect mechanism￿can also be induced as an equilibrium outcome of a ￿direct mechanism￿in
which the agent is asked to report the current type in each period, and where, in equilibrium, he
2￿nds it optimal to report truthfully.3
Let mt 2 ￿t denote the agent￿ s period-t message, and let mt ￿ (m1;:::mt).
A direct mechanism is a collection
￿ ￿
￿
￿t : ￿t ￿ Y t￿1 ! ￿(Yt)
￿T
t=1
such that for all t, and all measurable A ￿ Yt, ￿t(Aj￿) : ￿t ￿ Y t￿1 ! [0;1] is measurable. The
notation ￿t(Ajmt;yt￿1) stands for the probability that the mechanism generates yt 2 A ￿ Yt given
history (mt;yt￿1) 2 ￿t ￿ Y t￿1.
Given a direct mechanism ￿, and a history (￿t￿1;mt￿1;yt￿1) 2 ￿t￿1￿￿t￿1￿Y t￿1, the following
sequence of events takes place in each period t:




2. The agent sends a message mt 2 ￿t.
3. The mechanism selects a decision yt 2 Yt according to ￿t(￿jmt;yt￿1).
A (pure) strategy for the agent in a direct mechanism is a collection of measurable functions
￿ ￿
￿
￿t : ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1 ! ￿t
￿T
t=1 :
A strategy ￿ is truthful if for all t and all ((￿t￿1;￿t);mt￿1;yt￿1) 2 ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1,
￿t((￿t￿1;￿t);mt￿1;yt￿1) = ￿t:
This de￿nition identi￿es a unique strategy; such a strategy has the property that the agent reports
his current type truthfully after any history, including non-truthful ones. Note that we are not
claiming here that it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to mechanisms with the
property that the truthful strategy (as de￿ned above) is optimal at all histories. As explained
above, what the Revelation Principle guarantees is only that it is without loss of generality to
restrict attention to mechanisms where the agent ￿nds it optimal to report truthfully conditional
on having reported truthfully in the past; this is equivalent to requiring that the truthful strategy
be optimal at all truthful histories.
In order to describe expected payo⁄s, it is convenient to develop some more notation. First we
de￿ne histories. For all t = 0;1;:::, let
Ht ￿
￿
￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1￿
[
￿
￿t ￿ ￿t ￿ Y t￿1￿
[
￿
￿t ￿ ￿t ￿ Y t￿
;
3With a single agent, ￿in equilibrium￿means conditional on having reported truthfully in the past.
3where by convention H0 = f?g, and H1 = ￿1 [(￿1 ￿ ￿1)[(￿1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ Y1). Then Ht is the set of






denote the set of all histories. A history (￿s;mt;yu) 2 H is a successor to history (^ ￿
j
; ^ mk; ^ yl) 2 H
if (1) (s;t;u) ￿ (j;k;l), and (2) (￿j;mk;yl) = (^ ￿
j
; ^ mk; ^ yl). A history h = (￿s;mt;yu) 2 H is a
truthful history if ￿t = mt.
Fix a direct mechanism ￿, a strategy ￿, and a history h 2 H. Let ￿[￿;￿]jh denote the (unique)
probability measure on ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Y ￿ the product space of types, messages, and decisions￿ induced
by assuming that following history h in mechanism ￿, the agent follows strategy ￿ in the future.
More precisely, let h = (￿s;mt;yu). Then ￿[￿;￿]jh assigns probability one to (~ ￿; ~ m; ~ y) such that
(~ ￿
s
; ~ mt; ~ yu) = (￿s;mt;yu). Its behavior on ￿￿￿￿Y is otherwise induced by the stochastic process
that starts in period s with history h, and whose transitions are determined by the strategy ￿, the
mechanism ￿, and the kernels F. If h is the null history we then simply write ￿[￿;￿]. We also
adopt the convention of omitting ￿ from the arguments of ￿ when ￿ is the truthful strategy. Thus
￿[￿] is the ex-ante measure induced by truthtelling while ￿[￿]jh is the measure induced by the
truthful strategy following history h.
Given this notation, we write the agent￿ s expected payo⁄ when following history h he plays
according to strategy ￿ in the future as E￿[￿;￿]jh[U(~ ￿; ~ y)].4 Now, given a direct mechanism ￿, let
the agent￿ s value function V ￿ : H ! R be a mapping such that for all histories h 2 H,
V ￿(h) = sup
￿
E￿[￿;￿]jh[U(~ ￿; ~ y)]:
Incentive compatibility at a generic history h is then de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 2 Let h 2 H. A direct mechanism ￿ is incentive compatible at history h (IC at h) if
E￿[￿]jh[U(~ ￿; ~ y)] = V ￿(h):
In words, ￿ is IC at h if truthful reporting in the future maximizes the agent￿ s expected payo⁄
following history h. This de￿nition is ￿ exible in that it allows us to generate di⁄erent notions of IC
as special cases by requiring IC at all histories in a particular subset. For example, ex-ante IC is
equivalent to requiring IC only at the null history. Or in a static model (i.e., if T = 1), the standard
de￿nition of interim incentive compatibility obtains by requiring ￿ to be IC at all histories where
4Throughout we use ￿tildes￿to denote random variables with the same symbol without the tilde corresponding
to a particular realization.
4the agent knows only his type. In a dynamic model a natural alternative is to require that if the
agent has been truthful in the past, he ￿nds it optimal to continue to report truthfully. This is
obtained by requiring ￿ to be IC at all truthful histories.
The Principle of Optimality then implies that if ￿ is IC at h, then for ￿[￿]jh-almost all successors
h0 to h, ￿ is IC at h0. In particular, if ￿ is ex-ante IC , then truthtelling is also sequentially optimal
at truthful future histories h with probability one, and the agent￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ at such
histories is given by V ￿(h) with probability one. We will sometimes ￿nd it convenient to focus on
such histories, and they are the only ones that matter for ex-ante expectations.
2 Independent-Shock Representations
We now propose a way of characterizing the agent￿ s payo⁄ in an incentive-compatible mechanism
based on the idea that the information the agent receives over time can be conveniently described as
a function of ￿shocks￿that are serially independent. This approach complements the one illustrated
in the Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2009) in two ways: ￿rst, it permits us to accommodate the case
where T = +1; second, even when restricted to the case T < +1; it permits us to identify a
di⁄erent set of assumptions on the primitive environment that guarantee that the agent￿ s payo⁄ in
any incentive-compatible mechanism satis￿es a certain envelope condition.
We start by de￿ning what we mean when we say that a process admits an independent-shock
representation. Next, we de￿ne in what sense this representation is ￿strategically equivalent￿to
the original one and hence can be used to characterize incentive-compatible mechanisms. We then
proceed by showing how the formula for the (derivative of the) agent￿ s payo⁄ function simpli￿es
when the agent is asked to report the shocks instead of his types and identify conditions on the
agent￿ s reduced-form payo⁄ (i.e., his payo⁄ expressed as a function of the shocks) that validate
this formula. Finally, we conclude by showing that any stochastic process admits a particular
independent-shock representation which we use to identify conditions for the primitive environment
that guarantee that in the corresponding independent-shock representation the agent￿ s reduced-
form payo⁄ is ￿well-behaved￿in the sense that it satis￿es an envelope formula analogous to the
one derived in static settings. While these conditions di⁄er from the ones identi￿ed in PST using
a backward-induction approach, the formula for the derivative of the agent￿ s payo⁄ reduces to the
one in PST when expressed in terms of the primitive representation.
De￿nition 3 Fix T 2 N [ f+1g and let ~ " ￿ (~ "t)T
t=1 denote a collection of random variables
with support E ￿ ￿T
t=1Et ￿ RT and distribution G(￿;y) and z ￿
￿
zt : Et ￿ Y t￿1 ! ￿t
￿T
t=1 denote a
collection of measurable functions of these variables and of the decisions y. We say that (G;z);where
G ￿ hG(￿;y) : y 2 Y i; is an independent-shock (IS) representation for the stochastic process that
5corresponds to the kernels F ￿
￿
Ft : ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1 ! ￿(￿t)
￿T
t=1 if
(i) for each t, each yt￿1 2 Y t￿1; there exists a probability measure Gt(￿;yt￿1) on Et such that,
for any y G(￿;y) = ￿T
t=1Gt(￿;yt￿1); and
(ii) for any t, "t￿1 2 Et￿1 and yt￿1 2 Y t￿1, the distribution of zt(~ "t;yt￿1) given yt￿1 and ~ "t￿1 =
"t￿1 is the same as the distribution of ￿t given yt￿1 and ￿t￿1 = zt￿1("t￿1;yt￿2) ￿ (z￿("￿;y￿￿1))t￿1
￿=1.
Together, conditions (i) and (ii) say that, for any y, one can think of the agent￿ s primitive
information ￿ as being generated by the independent ￿shocks￿~ ".






where ￿t = 0 for any t ￿ 0; ￿j 2 R for any j = 1;:::;k, and "t is the realization of the random
variable ~ "t distributed according to some c.d.f. Gt with strictly positive density over R, independent
from all ~ "s, s 6= t. In this example, the functions zt do not depend on y and are given by
z1("1) = "1
z2("2) = ￿1"1 + "2
z3("3) = ￿1(￿1"1 + "2) + ￿2"1 + "3 = (￿2














Suppose now that the agent￿ s information ￿ is generated by the independent shocks " and let
z : E ￿ Y ! ￿ denote the function de￿ned by
z(";y) ￿ (z￿("￿;y￿￿1))T
￿=1:
Assume further that the agent observes not only ￿ but also the shocks ". The agent￿ s payo⁄ can
then be expressed in terms of the shocks " and the decisions y by the function ^ U : E ￿ Y ! R
de￿ned by
^ U(";y) ￿ U(z(";y);y): (1)
Next, consider a (randomized direct) mechanism
^ ￿ ￿
D




6in which the agent reports the shocks " instead of his primitive payo⁄-relevant information ￿.
For any t any yt￿1 2 Y t￿1, then let ^ Gt(￿jzt(~ "t;yt￿1)) denote any regular conditional probability
distribution for the random vector ~ "t given the sigma-algebra ￿(zt(~ "t;yt￿1)) generated by the
random vector zt(~ "t;yt￿1).5
The primitive representation (U;F) is equivalent to the representation (^ U;G;Z) in the following
sense.
Lemma 1 (a) Given any ex-ante IC mechanism ￿ for the primitive representation (U;F), there
exists an ex-ante IC mechanism ^ ￿ for the corresponding independent-shock representation (^ U;G;z)
such that, for any t, any measurable set A ￿ Yt, and any (￿t;yt￿1),
Z
^ ￿t(Aj"t;yt￿1)d ^ Gt("tjzt("t;yt￿1) = ￿t) = ￿t(Aj￿t;yt￿1): (2)
(b) Given any ex-ante IC mechanism ^ ￿ for the independent-shock representation (^ U;G;z), there
exists an ex-ante IC mechanism ￿ for the primitive representation (U;F) such that, for any t, any
measurable set A ￿ Yt, and any (￿t;yt￿1), (2) holds.
Hence any outcome (i.e., any joint distribution over ￿ ￿ Y ) that can be sustained by having
the agent report the payo⁄-relevant information ￿ can also be sustained by having him report the
shocks ", and vice versa. Note that Part (a) follows directly from the fact that if the mechanism ￿
is ex-ante IC, then the mechanism ^ ￿ de￿ned by
^ ￿t(￿j"t;yt￿1) = ￿t(￿jzt("t;yt￿1);yt￿1) 8("t;yt￿1) (3)
is also ex-ante IC. This mechanism de facto uses the same information as ￿, in the sense that it
depends on " only through z(";y). Part (b) is also trivially satis￿ed. It su¢ ces to construct ￿ from
^ ￿ using the transformation de￿ned in (2). To see that if ^ ￿ is ex-ante IC, so is ￿, it su¢ ces to note
that (i) payo⁄s depend on the shocks " only thought z(";y), (ii) ￿ induces the same distribution
over ￿ ￿ Y as ^ ￿, and (iii) any distribution over ￿ ￿ Y that the agent can induce given ￿ could
also have been induced given ^ ￿.
2.1 Necessary conditions for Incentive Compatibility
Suppose now that the primitive environment (U;F) admits an independent-shock representation
(^ U;G;z) ￿ we will show below that this is always the case. One can then use this representation
as an instrument to characterize the properties of incentive-compatible mechanisms. In particular,
as mentioned above, one can treat the shocks as the agent￿ s private information and then express
5Such a regular conditional probability distribution here exists since "
t 2 R
t.
7the (dynamics of the) agent￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ in terms of the (derivative of the) value function
with respect to the shocks. To this aim, let
^ H ￿
￿
("s;mt;yu) 2 Es ￿ Et ￿ Y u with T ￿ s ￿ t ￿ u ￿ s ￿ 1
￿
denote the set of all possible histories in the extensive form corresponding to the mechanism ^ ￿ for
the IS representation. For any ^ h 2 ^ H, then let ^ ￿[^ ￿]j^ h denote the (unique) probability measure over
E ￿E ￿Y induced by assuming that, following the history ^ h in the mechanism ^ ￿, the agent reports
truthfully at any subsequent information set. Finally, let ^ V
^ ￿(^ h) denote the agent￿ s value function
in ^ ￿ evaluated at history ^ h. We then have the following result.
Proposition 1 Fix t and suppose that Et = ("t;"t) ￿ R for some ￿1 ￿ "t ￿ "t ￿ +1: In
addition, suppose that there exists At 2 R+ such that, for any ("￿t;y) 2 E￿t ￿ Y;6 the function
^ U((￿;"￿t);y) : Et ! R is At-Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable in "t. Then after any history
^ ht￿1 = ("t￿1;^ "t￿1;yt￿1);the value function ^ V
^ ￿("t;^ ht￿1) is Lipschitz continuous in "t:
Furthermore,at any period-t history ("t;^ ht￿1) at which the mechanism ^ ￿ is IC and the value func-




= E^ ￿[^ ￿]j"t;^ ht￿1
"




The proof of this result is quite simple and follows from arguments similar to those that establish
the envelope theorem in a static setting.
Condition (1) provides a convenient representation of how the agent￿ s payo⁄ must vary with
the agent￿ s private information in an IC mechanism. In certain applications (e.g. the AR(k)
example described above), working directly with the reduced-form payo⁄ ^ U may facilitate the
characterization of the properties of optimal mechanisms. For the result in Proposition 1 to be
useful, it is however important to understand what properties of the payo⁄ function U and of
the functions z corresponding to the kernels F of the primitive representation guarantee that the
agent￿ s reduced-form payo⁄ ^ U is equi-Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable in "t. This is what
we address next.7 We start with an example which we believe is prominent in applications.
6Throughout, the notation E￿t stands for E￿t ￿ ￿￿6=tE￿:
7When T = +1; the properties of Frechet di⁄erentiability and equi-Lipschitz continuity are always meant to
apply with respect to the k￿k￿ norm. When, instead, T is ￿nite, the speci￿cation of the norm is irrelevant, for all
norms are equivalent.
8Assumption 1 There exists a collection of functions u ￿
￿
ut : ￿t ￿ Y t ! R
￿T
t=1 and a collection of
scalars B ￿ (Bt)T
t=1 with Bt 2 R+ for all t and
PT





and (ii) for any t any yt 2 Y t; ut(￿;yt) is Bt-Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable.
With a ￿nite horizon, part (i) is trivially satis￿ed and Assumption 1 is equivalent to assuming
that the function U(￿;y) is equi-Lipschitz and di⁄erentiable (as a multi-variate function) in ￿: With
an in￿nite horizon, assuming that U admits the additive representation of (5) is clearly not without
loss of generality. However, such a representation is quite standard in applications. Note that, in
an in￿nite-horizon setting, the condition on the summability of the Lipschitz constants is satis￿ed
for example when for any t ￿ 1; ut(￿t;yt) = ￿t￿1u(￿t;yt) with u(￿;yt) K￿ Lipschitz continuous and
di⁄erentiable and ￿ 2 (0;1): We then have the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that assumption 1 holds. Fix t and suppose that Et = ("t;"t) ￿ R for
some ￿1 ￿ "t ￿ "t ￿ +1: In addition, assume that, for any ￿ ￿ t; there exists a Ct;￿ 2 R+ such
that (a) for all ("￿
￿t;y￿￿1) 2 E￿
￿t ￿ Y ￿￿1;8 the function z￿((￿;"￿
￿t);y￿￿1) : Et ! ￿t is Ct;￿-Lipschitz
continuous and di⁄erentiable, and (b)
PT
￿=t Ct;￿ < +1: Then, for any ("￿t;y) 2 E￿t ￿ Y; the














One can verify that the conditions on the functions zt assumed in the proposition are satis￿ed
for example when ￿t evolves according to an AR(1) process with coe¢ cient of linear dependence
j￿1j < 1:
The result in the previous proposition can be generalized as follows.
Assumption 2 The function U(￿;y) : ￿ ! R is K￿Lipschitz continuous and (Frechet) di⁄eren-
tiable in ￿:
Proposition 3 Fix t and suppose that, in addition to assumption 2, Et = ("t;"t) ￿ R for some
￿1 ￿ "t ￿ "t ￿ +1 and that there exists a scalar Qt 2 R+ such that, for any ("￿t;y) 2 E￿t ￿ Y ,
the function z(￿;"￿t;y) : Et ! ￿ is Qt￿Lipschitz continuous and (Frechet) di⁄erentiable in "t. Then
8By E
￿
￿t we mean E
￿
￿t ￿ ￿j2Nnftg;j￿￿E￿:
9there exists an At 2 R+ such that, for any ("￿t;y) 2 E￿t ￿Y; the function ^ U((￿;"￿t);y) : Et ! R is











The proof for this proposition follows directly from the chain rule of Frechet di⁄erentiability. As
mentioned above, when T is ￿nite, then Frechet di⁄erentiability reduces to standard multivariate
di⁄erentiability. In this case, a su¢ cient condition for z(￿;"￿t;y) : Et ! ￿ to be di⁄erentiable and
equi-Lipschitz continuous is that each zs((￿;"s
￿t);ys￿1) : Et ! ￿s is di⁄erentiable and equi-Lipschitz
continuous in "t, t < s:
Comparing Proposition 3 to Proposition 2, it is immediate that the only di⁄erence between
the two emerges when T = 1: While Proposition 3 does not require U to take the additive
form of Assumption 1, it requires to check Frechet di⁄erentiability and equi-Lipschitz continuity
of U(￿;y) : ￿ ! R and z(￿;"￿t;y) : Et ! ￿. Proposition 2, on the other hand, presumes that
preferences admit the additive form of Assumption 1, but then requires to check di⁄erentiability
and equi-Lipschitz continuity of the single component functions z￿((￿;"￿
￿t);y￿￿1) : Et ! ￿t as
opposed to Frechet dii⁄erentiability and equi-Lipschitz continuity of the entire in￿nite-dimensional
mapping z(￿;"￿t;y) : Et ! ￿: The two propositions thus complement each other.
2.2 The canonical IS representation
While the results in the previous section apply to any IS representation, at this point one may
wonder which processes F admit an IS representation and which ones admit an IS representation
for which the corresponding z function satis￿es the properties of Propositions 2 and 3. We address
each of these questions in turn.
First, we show that any process admits a particular independent-shock representation, which
henceforth we refer to as the canonical representation. This representation is derived from the
kernels F as follows. Let ~ " denote a (possibly in￿nitely dimensional) vector of independent random
variables, each uniformly distributed over (0;1); independently from any other. Next, for any t,
any " 2 (0;1), any (￿t￿1;yt￿1); let
F￿1
t ("j￿t￿1;yt￿1) ￿ inff￿t : Ft(￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1) ￿ "g
denote the generalized inverse of the kernel Ft. Now let z : E ￿Y ￿! ￿ be the mapping recursively
de￿ned by
zt("t;yt￿1) ￿ F￿1
t ("t j F￿1
1 ("1); F￿1
2 ("2 j F￿1
1 ("1);y1);:::;yt￿1) 8t (6)
10Applying the probability integral transform theorem recursively, one can then show that, given any
yt￿1 2 Y t￿1 and any "t￿1 2 (0;1)t￿1, the distribution of zt(~ "t;yt￿1) given yt￿1 and ~ "t￿1 = "t￿1 is
the same as the distribution of ￿t given yt￿1 and ￿t￿1 = (F￿1
1 ("1);F￿1
2 ("2 j F￿1
1 ("1);y1);:::;yt￿1).
Hence, any process admits an independent-shock representation in which, for any t and yt￿1;
Gt(￿;yt￿1) is simply the uniform distribution over (0;1) and where the functions zt : Et￿Y t￿1 ! ￿t
are the ones de￿ned in (6).
Using the canonical representation, one can then identify conditions on the kernels F that
guarantee that the corresponding z function, as de￿ned in (6), satis￿es either the properties of
Proposition 2, or those of Proposition 3. We start with the following two preliminary conditions.
Assumption 3 For any t ￿ 1; any (￿t￿1;yt￿1) 2 ￿t￿1 ￿ Y t￿1; the function F￿1
t (￿j￿t￿1;yt￿1) is
di⁄erentiable.
Assumption 4 For any t ￿ 2, any " 2 (0;1) any yt￿1 2 Y t￿1; the function F￿1
t ("j￿;yt￿1) is
di⁄erentiable.
Together, these conditions guarantee di⁄erentiability of the components of the z function.
Lemma 2 Let (z;G) be the canonical IS representation for the process corresponding to the ker-
nels F: Assume that assumptions 3 and 4 hold. For any t ￿ 1 and any ￿ ￿ t; the function
z￿((￿;"￿























t ("t j F￿1
1 ("1); F￿1







m ("m j F￿1
1 ("1); F￿1
2 ("2 j F￿1
1 ("1);y1);:::;ym￿1)
@￿l
; m > l:
The proof follows again directly from the chain rule of di⁄erentiability. To apply the result in
Proposition 2 one then simply needs to guarantee that, in addition to be di⁄erentiable, the (inverse
of the) kernels be equi-Lipschitz continuous with appropriate bounds. Using the preceding lemma,
this in turn can be guaranteed by assuming that the following hold.
11Assumption 5 For any t ￿ 1; there exists a Mt 2 R+ such that, for any (￿t￿1;yt￿1) 2 ￿t￿1￿Y t￿1;
the function F￿1
t (￿j￿t￿1;yt￿1) is Mt￿ Lipschitz continuous.
Assumption 6 For any t;￿, ￿ > t, there exists a k￿











It is easy to see that assumption 6 holds for example when, for any t;￿, ￿ > t, the function
F￿1
￿ (" j (￿￿￿1
￿t ;￿);y￿￿1) is N￿
















5 < +1 for any t ￿ 1: (8)
This condition is easily satis￿ed when T is ￿nite. When T = 1, it is satis￿ed for example when ￿




￿ < 1, j = 1;:::;k: We then have the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that assumptions 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6, hold. Fix the history ^ ht￿1 ￿ ("t￿1;^ "t￿1;yt￿1).
The value function V
^ ￿("t;^ ht￿1) is Lipschitz continuous in "t:
Furthermore, at any "t at which V












t (~ "￿; ~ y￿￿1)




Next, consider the result in Proposition 3. To apply this proposition one needs that the function
z(￿;"￿t;y) : Et ! ￿ be equi-Lipschitz continuous and Frechet di⁄erentiable in "t: These proper-
ties can in turn be guaranteed by assuming that, in addition to conditions 3, 4, 5, the following
conditions hold.
Assumption 7 For any t any ("￿t;￿t￿1;y) 2 E￿t￿￿t￿1￿Y; the function Wt((￿;"￿t);(￿t￿1;￿);y) :
(0;1) ￿ ￿t
+ ! ￿ de￿ned by Wt
s(";￿;y) = ￿s for all s ￿ t ￿ 1 and
Wt
s(";￿;y) = F￿1
s ("sj￿s￿1;ys￿1) 8s ￿ t




















￿ ￿ ^ J￿
t ("￿;y￿￿1)
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ Kt:
Assumption 7 is an assumption of equi-di⁄erentiability of the kernels F￿1
s ("sj￿;ys￿1); s ￿ t.
Assumption 8 is a ￿backward-looking￿analog of assumption 6; note that this condition is satis￿ed
for example when, for any t;￿, ￿ > t, the function F￿1
￿ (" j (￿￿￿1
￿t ;￿);y￿￿1) is N￿
t ￿ equi-Lipschitz





















5 < +1: (10)
Assumption 9, which is weaker than (in the sense of being implied by) assumption 6, is satis￿ed
for example when there exists scalars B ￿ 0 and M ￿ 0 such that (i) ￿(B +M) < 1 and (ii) for all




￿ ￿ ￿ M￿￿1￿tB:
Combining the above results, leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that assumptions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9 hold. Then the same conclusions
as in Proposition 4 hold.
Propositions 4 and 5 thus identify a set of conditions for the primitive environment (U;F)
that guarantee that, in any IC mechanism, the agent￿ s expected payo⁄, when expressed using the
canonical IS representation, satis￿es the envelope formula of (1).
Note that, when applied to a ￿nite-horizon setting, the conditions in the two propositions
coincide; these conditions then reduce to assuming that the payo⁄ U be di⁄erentiable and equi-
Lipschitz continuous in ￿ and that the (inverse of the) kernels F￿1
t (" j ￿t￿1;yt￿1) be di⁄erentiable
and equi-Lipschitz continuous both in the ￿quantile￿ " and in the past ￿t￿1: Comparing these
conditions to those in Proposition 1 in PST (2009) one can see that while the assumptions in that
proposition rule out, for example, an atom at ￿t = ￿
#
t that ￿shifts￿with the past ￿t￿1 (e.g., fully
persistent types), such a possibility is accommodated by the assumptions in Proposition 5 above.
On the other hand, the assumptions in Proposition 5 rule out an atom at ￿t = ￿
#
t whose measure
grows with ￿t￿1 while such a possibility is allowed by the assumptions in Proposition 1 in PST
(2009). When applied to ￿nite-horizon environments, the result in (4) thus provides an alternative
closed-form representation for the derivative of the value function that one can use, for example,
when the assumptions in Proposition 1 in PST (2009) are violated. The most signi￿cant advantage
of Proposition 5 however remains the fact that it also permits one to identify necessary conditions
13for IC in in￿nite horizon settings.
Finally note that, while the formula in (4) describes the dynamics of the value function in the
mechanism ^ ￿ in which the agent reports the shocks " instead of his payo⁄-relevant types ￿; the same
formula also permits one to express the derivative of the value function in the original mechanism
￿ in which the agent reports ￿ instead of ": To see this, it su¢ ces to proceed as follows. Take any
mechanism ￿ for the primitive representation (U;F) and let ^ ￿ be the corresponding mechanism
in the independent-shock representation that is obtained from ￿ using (3). Because, for any y,
the agent￿ s payo⁄ in ^ ￿ depends on " only through z(";y), we have that, for any t; yt￿1 and "t the
following identity holds:
^ V
^ ￿("t;"t￿1;yt￿1) = V ￿(zt("t;yt￿1);zt￿1("t￿1;yt￿2);yt￿1): (11)
Therefore, at any point of di⁄erentiability of ^ V










While conditions (11) and (12) hold for all independent-shock representations, when (G;z) is the





Now suppose that the following two assumptions also hold.
Assumption 10 For all t, and all (￿t￿1;yt￿1) 2 ￿t￿1 ￿Y t￿1, the c.d.f. Ft(￿j￿t￿1;yt￿1) is strictly
increasing on ￿t.
Assumption 11 For all t and all
￿
￿t￿1;yt￿1￿




absolutely continuous with density ft
￿
￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1￿
> 0 for a.e. ￿t 2 ￿t.
Combining (12) with (4), it is then easy to see that, when in addition to the assumptions in
Proposition 5, assumptions 10 and 11 also hold, then ^ It
t("t;yt￿1) 6= 0 and
^ I￿






















lk￿1(￿lk;ylk￿1) for ￿ > t;
14with
Im
l (￿m;ym￿1) ￿ ￿
@Fm(￿mj￿m￿1;ym￿1)=@￿l
fm(￿mj￿m￿1;ym￿1)
for l < m:
The following is then an immediate implication of the aforementioned results.
Proposition 6 Suppose that, in addition to the assumptions in Propositions 4 (or to those in
Proposition 5), assumptions 10 and 11 hold. Then the conclusions of Proposition 2 in PST (2009)
hold. That is, if ￿ is IC at the truthful history ht￿1 ￿ (￿t￿1;￿t￿1;yt￿1), then
















Note that, while the conclusions in the two propositions are the same, the conditions in Propo-
sition 6 that validate (13) are somewhat di⁄erent from those in Proposition 2 in PST (2009). To
better appreciate this, it is instructive to consider the case of a ￿nite horizon. The key di⁄erences
between the assumptions in the two propositions are then the following. While (for generic non-




to be continuous in ￿t￿1 in the total variation metric, such an assumption is not
required under the IS approach in this paper. Furthermore, while the backward-induction approach
requires the (absolute value of) the derivative of the Kernels j@Ft(￿tj￿t￿1;yt￿1)=@￿sj to be bounded
uniformly in (￿t￿1;yt￿1) by an integrable function Bt : ￿t ! R+ [ f+1g such an assumption is
not required under the IS approach. On the other hand, while the backward-induction approach
only requires the payo⁄ U and each kernel Ft to be partially di⁄erentiable in each ￿s, the IS ap-
proach requires these functions to be totally di⁄erentiable (in ￿ and ￿t￿1 respectively). The two
propositions thus complement each other by identifying di⁄erent sets of assumptions that validate
the dynamic payo⁄ formula given in (13) as a necessary condition for incentive compatibility.
3 Bandit Auctions
To illustrate how the results in the previous section can be put to work, we now consider a multi-
agent quasilinear setting where buyers re￿ne their valuations through consumption. For an illustra-
tion of how the multi-agent setting can be mapped into a single agent setting, we refer the reader to
Section 4 in PST. The purpose of this section is to illustrate how the independent-shock approach
outlined above can help characterize the properties of optimal mechanisms in in￿nite-horizon set-
tings.
Setup. There is an auctioneer and N ￿ 1 bidders. In each period, t = 1;2;:::T, with T = +1;
15the auctioneer has one indivisible, non-storable, object to sell. If he allocates the period-t object to
agent i, he incurs a cost ci;t 2 R. If the object goes unassigned, the auctioneer incurs no cost, and














t=1 Xi;t denote the relevant sets of feasible allocations (Here i = 0 refers to the seller).
















where ￿i;t 2 ￿i;t and pi;t 2 R denote, respectively, the period-t valuation and the period-t payment
for agent i; ￿t = (￿1;t;:::;￿N;t) 2
QN
i=1 ￿i;t and pt = (p1;t;:::;pN;t) 2 RN a pro￿le of valuations and
payments for period t, ￿ = (￿t)T
t=1 the complete state of the world, and p = (pt)T
t=1 2 RNT the
payments received by the auctioneer over time.
The stochastic process governing the evolution of each ￿i;t is as follows. The ￿rst period valuation
￿i;1 is drawn from an absolutely continuous c.d.f. Fi;1 strictly increasing over the interval ￿i;1 =
(￿i;1;￿ ￿i;1) ￿ R with density fi;1(￿i;1) > 0 if and only if ￿i;1 2 ￿i;1: For any t > 1; the period-t
valuation ￿i;t is given by
￿i;t = ￿i;t￿1 + "i;t;
where the shock "i;t is drawn from the c.d.f. Gi;t(￿jxt￿1
i ). In other words,
Fi;t(￿i;tj￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) = Gi;t(￿i;t ￿ ￿i;t￿1 j xt￿1
i )




Furthermore, for any i = 1;:::;N; given xT
i ; the shocks "T
i = ("i;1;:::"i;T) are jointly independent,
i.e.
Gi(￿jxt￿1
i ) = ￿T
t=1Gi;t(￿jxt￿1
i )
In addition to the aforementioned properties, the family of distributions Gi;t(￿jxt￿1
i ) satis￿es
the following conditions: (a) for any xt￿1
i such that xi;t￿1 = 0; Gi;t(￿jxt￿1
i ) is a Dirac delta at
0; (b) for any t;￿; any xt￿1
i and ^ x￿￿1
i such that xi;t￿1 = ^ xi;￿￿1 = 1 and
P￿￿1




i ) = Gi;￿(￿j^ xt￿1
i ); (c) for any xt￿1
i such that xi;t￿1 = 1; Gi;t(￿jxt￿1
i ) is absolutely continuous
with density strictly positive almost everywhere on R.
The ￿rst condition says that valuations do not change in the absence of consumption. The
second condition says that, conditional upon consumption in the preceding period, the distribution




The last condition, which is not essential for the subsequent results, makes the analysis of IC
simpler by establishing that the support of ￿i;t is independent of ￿t￿1
i : Given these properties, for
simplicity, hereafter we denote the distributions of the shocks by Gi;t(￿jxi;t￿1;
Pt￿1
s=1 xi;s).
Remark 1 This kind of structure arises for example in a model with Normal learning. There ￿t is
the posterior expectation of the true underlying valuation, and the impact of the kth signal on the
posterior is the same regardless of the period in which it arrives. More generally, this speci￿cation
allows for learning by doing (or habit formation), for it does not require the mean of "t to be zero.
Summarizing, the key assumptions are the following.
1. Valuations are independent across bidders.
2. Valuations change only upon consumption.
3. The environment is Markov: payo⁄s are additively time-separable and, conditional on allo-
cations, the valuations follow a Markov process.
4. The valuation processes are time-homogenous: If bidder i wins the auction in period t, then
the distribution of his period t + 1 valuation depends only on his valuation in period t and
the total number of times he has won in the past.
IS representation, and Necessary IC conditions. The structure of the payo⁄s and of the
process for the valuations suggest using a non-canonical IS representation where the distributions of





where for any i; any t > 1; the shock "i;t 2 Ei;t = R are the same shocks described above. Because
the functions zi;t("t
i;yt
i) do not depend on yt
i = (xt￿1
i ;pt￿1






s=1: Each agent￿ s reduced form payo⁄ then takes the form































￿ ￿ = ￿txi;t ￿ ￿t:
































From Proposition 1, we then have that, in any ex-ante IC mechanism ^ ￿; each bidder i￿ s value
function ^ V
^ ￿













Maximing virtual surplus, Gittins indices. Given a deterministic allocation rule ^ ￿ :=
￿
^ ￿t : RNt ! Xt
￿1












~ "i;￿ ￿ ci;t ￿





where ^ ￿[^ ￿] is the unique probability measure over E induced by the allocation rule ^ ￿, under
truthtelling by all agents.
At this point, it is convenient to switch back to the original representation with ￿ as this makes









~ ￿i;t ￿ ci;t ￿







Once again, the notation ￿[￿] stands for the unique probability measure over E induced by the
allocation rule ^ ￿, under truthtelling by all agents.
18Now, given ￿1, we have a standard (N+1)-armed bandit problem (i.e., N bidders plus a safe arm
with payo⁄ 0 which corresponds to not selling) where the objective function is given by the above
virtual surplus. If the auctioneer were to maximize social surplus instead of pro￿ts the objective
















The Gittins index for the safe arm is identically zero in both programs. The Gittins index for arm













t=1 ￿t j ￿i;1
3
5;
where ￿ is a stopping time (i.e., it is not just a scalar, but a policy rule that conditions on history),
and the expectation is taken conditional on the ￿rst type being ￿i;1 and the object being allocated























~ ￿i;t ￿ ci;t
￿
P￿











i;1(￿i;1) is the corresponding Gittins index in the e¢ cient program. We can similarly
calculate (and relate) the Gittins indices in an arbitrary period t following any bidder i history











~ ￿i;s ￿ ci;s
￿
P￿












(Again the expectation is conditional on the optimal stopping policy ￿.) Given the Markov structure
the indices do not directly depend on ￿t￿1
i;￿1 (￿E
i;t doesn￿ t depend on ￿i;1 either), and depend on xt￿1
i
only through the sum of its terms. It is well-known that a Gittins index policy is an optimal policy
19in a multi-armed bandit problem of the above form. This immediately implies the following result.
Proposition 7 Let ￿￿ be the allocation rule such that for all i, t, ￿t, and xt￿1,
￿￿




Then ￿￿ maximizes dynamic virtual surplus.
Obviously social surplus is also maximized by using an index policy.
Incentive compatibility. The e¢ cient policy can be implemented for example with the Team
Mechanism. Consider then the pro￿t maximizing policy.
Proposition 8 Assume that ￿rst period hazard rates are nondecreasing. Then the allocation rule
of Proposition 7 is sustained under an optimal mechanism.
The proof in the Appendix proceeds as follows. First we show that, because at any t ￿ 2; ￿￿ is
e¢ cient given the period-1 reports ￿1 (with the seller￿ s adjusted cost of serving bidder i in period
t set equal to ci;t ￿
1￿Fi;1(￿i;1)
f1(￿i;1) ), there always exist a system of payments that induce each bidder to
report truthfully from period two onwards, at any period-t history, t ￿ 2; irrespective of whether
the history is truthful or not. Next, we use the fact ￿￿ is weakly monotone to show that there
exists a payment scheme p￿ that, in addition to the property described above, it also induces the
bidders to report truthfully in period 1. Lastly, we verify that under the mechanism ￿￿ = [￿;p￿]
each bidder ￿nds it optimal to participate and each type ￿i;1 obtains a payo⁄ equal to the outside
option. That the mechanism ￿￿ is optimal then follows from the same arguments that establish
Proposition 5 in PST.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Fix the history ^ ht￿1 = ht = ("t￿1;^ "t￿1;yt￿1) and for any "t;mt 2 Et; let ￿[^ ￿; ^ ￿]jmt;"t;^ ht￿1
denote the (unique) measure over E ￿ E ￿ Y that is obtained by assuming that, after history
ht = ("t;^ "t￿1;yt￿1) is reached, in period t the agent sends the message mt and then starting from
period t + 1 onwards he follows an arbitrary strategy
^ ￿ ￿
￿
^ ￿t : Et ￿ Et￿1 ￿ Y t￿1 ! Et
￿T
t=1 :
The key observation here is that, because of the independence of the shocks, the restriction of the
measure ￿[^ ￿; ^ ￿]jmt;"t;^ ht￿1 on future shocks, current and future reports, and current and future
20decisions, i.e. on Et+1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ET ￿ Et ￿ ￿ ￿ ET ￿ Yt ￿ ￿ ￿ YT, does not depend on the true shock
"t:9 Formally, let P(mt;^ ht￿1; ^ ￿) denote such restriction and ￿"t;^ ht￿1 denote the Dirac measure at
("t;^ ht￿1) over past and current shocks, past reports, and past decisions, i.e. over E1 ￿￿￿Et ￿E1 ￿
￿ ￿ Et￿1 ￿ Y1 ￿ ￿ ￿ Yt￿1: Then the measure ￿[^ ￿; ^ ￿]jmt;"t;^ ht￿1 on E ￿ E ￿ Y can be decomposed as
￿[^ ￿; ^ ￿]jmt;"t;^ ht￿1 = ￿"t;^ ht￿1 ￿ P(mt;^ ht￿1; ^ ￿):
By implication,
E￿[^ ￿;^ ￿]jmt;"t;^ ht￿1 h
^ U(~ "; ~ y)
i
= EP(mt;^ ht￿1;^ ￿)
h
^ U("t;~ "t+1;::;~ "T;yt￿1; ~ yt;::; ~ yT)
i
:
Now, because for any ("￿t;y) 2 E￿t ￿ Y the function ^ U(￿;"￿t;y) is At-Lipschitz continuous, we
have that, for any "t;"0












On the other hand, because P(mt;^ ht￿1; ^ ￿) is a probability measure, EP(mt;^ ht￿1;^ ￿) [At] = At. Hence




















^ U("t￿1;"t;~ "t+1;:;~ "T;yt￿1; ~ yt;::; ~ yT) ￿ ^ U("t￿1;"0









^ U("t￿1;"t;~ "t+1;:;~ "T;yt￿1; ~ yt;:; ~ yT) ￿ ^ U("t￿1;"0




= EP(mt;^ ht￿1;^ ￿)
"




which implies that, for any plan of action ^ ￿; the expected payo⁄ E￿[^ ￿;^ ￿]jmt;￿;^ ht￿1 h
^ U(~ "; ~ y)
i
is At-
Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable in "t. The result then follows from essentially the same
arguments that establish Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002):10 the value function ^ V
^ ￿(￿;^ ht￿1)





t￿1) only through the reported shocks ^ "
t￿1 and the past decisions y
t￿1:
10Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002) establishes only that the value function is absolutely continuous; this
is because that theorem assumes that the payo⁄ is di⁄erentiable with an integrable bound instead of di⁄erentiable
and equi-Lipschitz continuous. It is however immediate to see that the same arguments that establish Theorem 2 in
Milgrom and Segal also establish that the value function is equi-Lipschitz continuous under the stronger assumptions
considered here.
21is Lipschitz continuous in "t and at any history ("t;^ ht￿1) at which ^ ￿ is IC and ^ V





= E^ ￿[^ ￿]j"t;^ ht￿1
"
@ ^ U(~ "; ~ y)
@"t
#
where ^ ￿[^ ￿]j"t;^ ht￿1 is the measure over E ￿ E ￿ Y induced by assuming that, starting from period
t the agent follows a truthful strategy at all current and future information sets.
Proof of Proposition 2. For any t and any ("t;yt) 2 Et ￿ Y t; let
^ ut("t;yt) ￿ ut(zt("t;yt￿1);yt);
so that, under assumption 1,




The result follows from combining the following two lemmas below.
Lemma 3 Fix t: Suppose that, for any ￿ ￿ t; there exists a Dt;￿ 2 R+ such that (a) for all
("￿
￿t;y￿) 2 E￿
￿t￿Y ￿; the function ^ u￿(￿;"￿
￿t;y￿) is Dt;￿-Lipschitz and di⁄erentiable, and (b)
PT
￿=t Dt;￿ <
+1. Then there exists an At 2 R+ such that, for any ("￿t;y) 2 E￿t ￿Y; the function ^ U((￿;"￿t);y)














































where the second equality is by the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem, since, for any



















Lemma 4 Suppose the assumptions in Proposition 2 hold. Then for all ￿ ￿ t there exists Dt;￿ 2 R+
such that (a) for all ("￿
￿t;y￿) 2 E￿
￿t ￿Y ￿, ^ u￿((￿;"￿















￿=t Dt;￿ < +1.
Proof of the Lemma. Fix ("￿
￿t;y￿) 2 E￿
￿t ￿Y ￿ and let z￿((￿;"￿
￿t);y￿￿1) : Et ! R￿ denote the






s=1 8"t 2 Et
Because each component function zs is di⁄erentiable in "t so is z￿((￿;"￿
￿t);y￿￿1). The function
^ u￿((￿;"￿
￿t);y￿) : Et ! R de￿ned by
^ u￿(("t;"￿
￿t);y￿) ￿ u￿(z￿(("t;"￿
￿t);y￿￿1);y￿) 8"t 2 Et
is thus the composition of two di⁄erentiable functions and hence, by the chain rule, it is itself




























￿t);y￿) is Lipschitz continuous with constant Dt;￿ = B￿
P￿































Proof of Proposition 4. The proof consists in showing that assumptions ??, ??, 3, 4, 5, and
6 imply that the mapping z satis￿es the properties of Proposition 2. Once this is established, the
result follows from Proposition 2.













￿ ￿ ￿ Mt (15)
(where the inequality follows from assumption 5). Furthermore, for any ￿ ￿ t ￿ 1 any ("￿;y￿￿1) 2













(where the inequality follows from assumptions 5 and 6).
The function z￿((￿;"￿
￿t);y￿￿1) : Et ! ￿￿ is thus Ct;￿-Lipschitz continuous with constant Ct;￿
equal to the RHS of (15) if ￿ = t and to the RHS of (16) if ￿ > t. That
PT
￿=t Ct;￿ < +1 follows
directly by assumption 6.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof shows that under the assumptions in the proposition the
mapping z satis￿es the properties of Proposition 3. Once this is established, the result then follows
from Proposition 3.
For simplicity, we prove the result here for t = 1: Similar arguments establish the result for any
arbitrary t > 1: Part (1) establishes (Frechet) di⁄erentiability of z(￿;"￿1;y) : E1 ! ￿. Part (2)
establishes equi-Lipschitz continuity.
Part (1): Di⁄erentiability. Frechet di⁄erentiability of z(￿;"￿1;y) : E1 ! ￿ is established
using the implicit function theorem (IFT) for Banach spaces. We simplify notation by treating z
as a function of "1 only. That is, ￿x ("￿1;y) and drop it and let " := "1: Furthermore, to simplify
the derivation, assume that E1 = R. It is immediate to see that the formula in (4) can be obtained
from the results below by multiplying everything by ^ I1
1("1) = dF￿1
1 ("1)=d"1:
For any t > 1; also let
ft(￿t￿1) := F￿1
t ("tj￿t￿1;yt￿1);
where "t and yt￿1 are ￿xed and hence dropped. Notice that, given (ft)t￿2, z : R ! ￿ is de￿ned
24implicitly as the solution to the system:
" ￿ ￿1 = 0
f2(￿1) ￿ ￿2 = 0
. . .
ft(￿t￿1) ￿ ￿t = 0
. . .
Equivalently,
" ￿ z1(") = 0
f2(z1(")) ￿ z2(") = 0
. . .
ft(zt￿1(")) ￿ zt(") = 0
. . .
Motivated by this observation we endow R ￿ ￿ with the norm khkR￿￿ = supt ￿t jhtj, where t =
0;1;2;::: with h0 2 R and h￿0 2 ￿. (That is, k￿kR￿￿ is just like the norm k￿k￿ except that t starts
from 0 rather than 1.) This turns R ￿ ￿ into a Banach space (recall that k￿k￿ < 1 for all ￿ 2 ￿).
Also note that while the results here assume that E1 = R and that ￿ = R1
￿ where R1
￿ is the set of
all real sequences x 2 R1 such that kxk￿ < 1; all the subsequent results extend to the case that
E1 $ R and that ￿ $ R1
￿ ).






















So z is now implicitly de￿ned as the unique solution to
T(";z(")) = 0:
By the IFT for Banach spaces if
25(1) T("0;z("0)) = 0 all "0 2 R;
(2) T is Frechet di⁄erentiable;
(3) ￿ 7! DT(";z("))(0;￿) is a Banach space isomorphism from ￿ onto ￿,
then z is Frechet di⁄erentiable in a neighborhood of " (Above the bounded linear operator
DT(";z(")) is the derivative of T at (";z (")).)
Condition 1 is true by construction. As for 2 and 3, de￿ne f1 : R ! ￿1 by setting f1(") = ".
Let f = (f1;f2;:::) : R ￿ ￿ ! ￿. We then have
T(";￿) = f(";￿) ￿ ￿:
Throughout we adopt the convention of indexing an element x of R￿￿ starting from zero so that
x = (x0;x1;:::) with x0 2 R and x￿0 2 ￿.
Simply writing out the de￿nitions we have the following preliminary observation.
Lemma 5 Let f be Frechet di⁄erentiable at (";￿). Assume that each ft : ￿t￿1 ! R, t ￿ 2, is
























where, for each t ￿ 1; rft(￿t￿1) denotes the gradient of ft at ￿t￿1:
Proof. Proof of the Lemma. The proof is standard and hence omitted.
Note that the assumption that f is Frechet di⁄erentiable is guaranteed by Assumption 7, while
that each ft : ￿t￿1 ! R, t ￿ 2, is di⁄erentiable is guaranteed by Assumption 4. We then have the
following result.
Lemma 6 Assume that f is Frechet di⁄erentiable at (";￿). Then T is Frechet di⁄erentiable at
(";￿), and its derivative at (";￿) is the bounded linear operator DT(";￿) : R ￿ ￿ ! ￿ de￿ned by
DT(";￿)h = Df(";￿)h ￿ h￿0:
Proof. Proof of the Lemma. Note ￿rst that T maps from a Banach space into a Banach space.
26Since T(";￿) = f(";￿) ￿ ￿, the obvious candidate for its Frechet derivative is
DT(";￿)h = Df(";￿)h ￿ h￿0;
which is clearly linear. In order to show that DT(";￿) is a bounded operator, note that for all
h 2 R ￿ ￿,
kDT(";￿)hk￿ ￿ kDf(";￿)hk￿ + kh￿0k￿
￿ B khkR￿￿ + khkR￿￿
= (1 + B)khkR￿￿
< +1
since B < +1 and h 2 ￿; which implies that khkR￿￿ < +1: The existence of the constant B
follows from the fact that the Frechet derivative of f is by de￿nition a bounded operator. It remains
to show that DT(";￿) is the derivative of T at (";￿). We have
0 ￿ lim
h!0








kf((";￿) + h) ￿ f(";￿) ￿ Df(";￿)hk￿
khkR￿￿
= 0;
where the last equality follows by the assumed Frechet di⁄erentiability of f. ￿
We now turn to Condition (3). Let ^ Jt
s denote the (inverse) impulse response functions, as









Because ("￿1;y) is ￿xed, we then let ^ It













t(") ￿ 1. We then have the following result.







￿ ￿ ^ Jt
t￿￿(")
￿
￿ ￿ < 1;
then ￿ 7! DT(";z("))(0;￿) is a Banach space isomorphism from ￿ onto ￿.
Proof. Proof of the Lemma. Fix " and then drop it from all ^ I and ^ J functions. By Lemma
6, T is Frechet di⁄erentiable at (";z(")) with derivative DT(";z("))￿. We show ￿rst that ￿ 7!
DT(";z("))(0;￿) is onto. Fix u 2 ￿. By Lemmas 5 and 6 we have
























Hence to ￿nd the preimage of u, we de￿ne ￿ recursively by
￿1 = ￿u1; (17)




s￿s for t > 1:
It remains to show that if u 2 ￿; that is, if kuk￿ < 1, then ￿ so constructed has k￿k￿ < 1, and






For t = 1 this is clearly true. Suppose it holds for all ￿ < t. We have





























































￿ < 1 and the right-hand
side is ￿nite. This can be seen as follows. Since f is Frechet di⁄erentiable, Df(";z(")) is a bounded
operator. Thus there exists B < 1 such that for all ￿ 2 R ￿ ￿, all t ￿ 2,












Now choose ￿ such that 9!￿ ￿ 2 : ￿￿ = 1 and ￿s = 0 for s 6= ￿. Then the above inequality implies




￿ ￿ ￿ B￿￿￿t < 1:
By implication
￿
￿ ￿ ^ Jt
￿
￿




￿ ￿ ^ Jt
t￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ is ￿nite. Hence
the sup can be in￿nite only if it is approached as t ! 1. But the limit is ￿nite by Assumption 9.
We ￿nish the proof by showing that ￿ 7! DT(";z("))(0;￿) is an isomorphism. Recall that every
one-to-one bounded linear operator from a Banach space onto a Banach space is an isomorphism
(see, e.g., Corollary 1.6.6. in Megginson￿ s "An Introduction to Banach Space Theory"). Above
it was shown that ￿ 7! DT(";z("))(0;￿) is onto, and it is obviously bounded. Hence it su¢ ces
to show that ￿ 7! DT(";z("))(0;￿) is one-to-one. Let ￿, ￿0 be such that DT(";z("))(0;￿) =
DT(";z("))(0;￿0). By inspection of the ￿rst line in the formula for DT(";z("))(0;￿) above, we
have ￿1 = ￿0
1. But then the second line gives ￿2 = ￿0
2, and so on. Thus ￿ = ￿0 and hence
￿ 7! DT(";z("))(0;￿) is one-to-one as desired. ￿




￿ ￿ ^ Jt
t￿￿(")
￿
￿ ￿ < 1 is guaranteed by Assumption 8.
Lemmas 5-7 together with the IFT thus establish Frechet di⁄erentiability of z(￿;"￿1;y) : E1 ! ￿.




1;:::). (Recall that ^ J1
1 ￿ 1.)
Lemma 8 Let " 2 R. Under the assumptions in the Proposition, the Frechet derivative of z at ",
z0(") : R ! ￿, is given by
z0(")￿ = ^ J1(")￿:
Proof. Proof of the Lemma. Fix ". Since z is Frechet di⁄erentiable at ", there exists a bounded
linear operator z0(") : R ! ￿ such that
lim
￿!0
kz(" + ￿) ￿ z(") ￿ z0(")￿k￿
j￿j
= 0:
29We will show by induction on t that z0(")￿ = ^ J1(")￿. Note ￿rst that the operator ￿ 7! ^ J1(")￿ is























where the last inequality follows from the proof in the previous lemma. Now, by induction, suppose
that, for all ￿ < t, z￿ : R ! ￿￿ is di⁄erentiable at " with z0
￿(") = ^ J￿
1("). Note that for t = 2 this is
trivially true since f1(") is linear. Next note that zt￿1 := (z1;:::;zt￿1) : R ! ￿t￿1 is di⁄erentiable













zt is di⁄erentiable at " with derivative z0
t("). Furthermore, ft is di⁄erentiable by Assumption 4 so


























where the last two equalities follow by the de￿nitions of ^ I and ^ J. This establishes the inductive
step and concludes the proof. ￿







That z is Lipschitz continuous then follows from Lemma 8 together with Proposition 2 on p. 176
of Luenberger (1969).
Proof of Proposition 6. The initial steps of the proof are in the main text. Here we simply
prove that, under the assumptions in the proposition, the formula in (4) reduces to the one in (13).
First note that, under the assumptions in the proposition, from the implicit function theorem
30applied to the identity
F￿1
s (Fs(￿sj￿s￿1;ys￿1)j￿s￿1;ys￿1) = ￿s
for any ￿s 2 ￿s; s > t; any (￿s￿1;ys￿1); Fs(￿sj￿s￿1;ys￿1) is di⁄erentiable in ￿s￿1. Next note that
the implicit function theorem applied to the identity
Fs(F￿1
s ("sj￿s￿1;ys￿1)j￿s￿1;ys￿1) = "s
implies that, for any t < s; "s; (￿s￿1;ys￿1);
@F￿1
















t ("s;ys￿1) ￿ ￿
@F￿1



















t ("s;ys￿1) = Js
t (zs("s;ys￿1);ys￿1):


























which is the same formula as in (13).
Proof of Proposition 8. First note that, because the environment is quasilinear and Markov (in





i ) depends only on his current type ￿i;t, the history of messages
he sent mt
i and the number of times he consumed in the past,
Pt￿1
s=1 xi;s:
31Second note that, starting from period two onwards, and irrespective of whether the period-one
announcements were truthful or not, the allocation rule ￿ of Proposition 7 coincides with the one
that maximizes the sum of the bidders￿continuation payo⁄s and of the seller￿ s adjusted continuation
payo⁄, where the latter is obtained by replacing each cost ci;t with the cost




Furthermore, because each player￿ s continuation payo⁄(including the seller￿ s adjusted continuation
payo⁄) depends only on his own types and decisions, it is immediate to see that truthtelling at any

























i;t(￿t) if j = 0:
To establish incentive compatibility at t = 1; we use the analog of the weak monotonicity result
of Proposition 8 in PST (note that, while the result there is for the case where T is ￿nite, it is
immediate to see that the same arguments apply to the case T = 1). We start with the following
result.


















Proof of the Lemma. To prove the lemma, it is convenient to note that, without loss, we
can think of the valuation process of bidder i as being generated as follows. First, ￿i;1 is drawn
according to Fi;1. Next, a sequence ￿i = (￿i;k)1
k=1 is drawn according to the product measure
￿1
k=1Gi(￿j1;k). Then we take the innovation term following the kth time i wins the object to
be ￿i;k. Now, while the distribution of ￿ (and even that of ") depends on mi;1 through ￿, the
distribution of ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿N) is independent of mi;1.
Fix i, ￿i;1, mi;1 and m0
i;1 > mi;1. We establish the result by showing, by induction on k, that
for any realizations of ￿￿i;1 and of ￿ and for all k, if bidder i￿ s kth win comes in period t given mi;1,
then it comes at some s ￿ t given m0
i;1. To this end, ￿x an arbitrary realizations ￿￿i;1 and ￿. Let
k = 1 and suppose to the contrary that given mi;1 bidder i￿ s ￿rst win comes in period t, and given
32m0
i;1 it comes in period s > t. (If bidder i never wins given mi;1, then t = +1 and the claim is
trivially true.) Note that, since (￿1;￿) is ￿xed, the allocations are the same in both cases in periods
1;:::;t ￿ 1. Hence also the other bidders￿realized Gittins indices in period t are the same in both
cases. Since i wins at t, his Gittins index ￿i;1(mi;1) must be the highest. But given the hazard
rate assumption and the form of the process for ￿i;t, the index ￿i;1(mi;1) is nondecreasing in mi;1.
Hence i must also win at t with m0
i;1, a contradiction.
Next, suppose that the claim is true for some k ￿ 1. Assume to the contrary that the k + 1th
win given mi;1 comes in period t, and given mi;1 it comes in period s > t. Note that during periods
1;:::;t ￿ 1 bidder i wins k times in both cases. Also, since (￿1;￿) is ￿xed, the remaining t ￿ 1 ￿ k
wins go to the same bidders in both cases. In particular, since the Gittins index only depends
on the ￿rst message, the most recent valuation, and the number of times the bidder has won the
object, it must be that the other bidders￿period-t Gittins indices are the same in both cases. Now,
since (￿i;1;￿i) is ￿xed, bidder i￿ s realized period t valuation ￿i;t is the same in both cases since in










~ ￿i;s ￿ ci;s
￿
P￿














~ ￿i;s ￿ ci;s
￿
P￿







where the inequality is by the hazard rate assumption. Thus, if i wins at t given mi;1, he must also
win at t given m0
i;1. But this contradicts s > t.￿
Now, consider the payment scheme such that p￿
i;t is as in (18) for all t > 1, while for t = 1
p￿






































From the same arguments as in Proposition 8 in PST, one can then verify that, under the mechanism
￿￿ = [￿￿;p￿]; the agent ￿nds it optimal to report truthfully at all histories and to participate in
period one. One can also check that each bidder￿ s expected payo⁄ when his period-one type is the
lowest, i.e., at ￿i;1 = ￿i;1 is zero. That the mechanism ￿ is optimal then follows from the same
33arguments that establish Proposition 5 in PST.
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